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1Abstract
The emergence and maintainance of cooperation by natural selection is an
enduring conundrum in evolutionary biology, which has been studied us-
ing a variety of game theoretical models inspired by different biological
situations. The most widely studied games are the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
the Snowdrift game and by-product mutualism for pairwise interactions,
as well as Public Goods games in larger groups of interacting individuals.
Here we present a general framework for cooperation in social dilemmas
in which all the traditional scenarios can be recovered as special cases. In
social dilemmas cooperators provide a beneﬁt to the group at some cost,
while defectors exploit the group by reaping the beneﬁts without bearing
the costs of cooperation. Using the concepts of discounting and synergy
for describing how beneﬁts accumulate when more than one cooperator
is present in a group of interacting individuals, we recover the four ba-
sic scenarios of evolutionary dynamics given by (i) dominating defection,
(ii) co-existence of defectors and cooperators, (iii) dominating cooperation
and (iv) bi-stability, in which cooperators and defectors cannot invade each
other. Generically, for groups of three or more interacting individuals fur-
ther, more complex, dynamics can occur. Our framework provides the ﬁrst
unifying approach to model cooperation in different kinds of social dilem-
mas.
21 Modeling Cooperation
The question of how natural selection can lead to cooperation has fascinated evolu-
tionary biologists since Darwin (Darwin, 1859, Hammerstein, 2003, Maynard Smith
& Szathm´ ary, 1995, Trivers, 1971). Cooperation among relatives is explained by kin
selection representing the idea that selﬁsh genes lead to unselﬁsh phenotypes (Frank,
1989, Hamilton, 1963). For the evolution of cooperation among genetically unre-
lated individuals various mechanisms have been put forward based on evolutionary
game theory: cooperators form groups and thus preferentially interact with other co-
operators (Sober & Wilson, 1998, Wilson & Sober, 1994); cooperators occupy spa-
tial positions in lattices or networks and interact with their neighbors who are also
cooperators (Hauert, 2001, Killingback et al., 1999, Nowak & May, 1992); optional
interactions can stabilize cooperation (Hauert et al., 2002, Semmann et al., 2003); re-
peated games enable the emergence of direct reciprocity (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981,
Nowak & Sigmund, 1993); and reputation facilitates the evolution of cooperation via
indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987, Nowak & Sigmund, 1998) or punishment op-
portunities (Sigmund et al., 2001).
The vast majority of models on the evolution of cooperation consider pairwise in-
teractions: a cooperator meeting another cooperator obtains the reward R, but against
a defector the cooperator is left with the sucker’s payoff S. In contrast, the defector
exploits the cooperator and receives the temptation T, but when facing another defec-
tor each gets the punishment P. This terminology was introduced for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, which is deﬁned by the payoff ranking T>R>P>S . Hence defection
dominates cooperation because it is better to defect regardless of what the partner
does. In terms of costs c and beneﬁts b of cooperation, the Prisoner’s Dilemma de-
scribes situations where costs incur to the cooperator but beneﬁts accrue exclusively
to the partner, i.e. T = b,R = b − c,P =0and S = −c with b>c . This represents
the most stringent form of a social dilemma.
31.1 Social Dilemmas
Social dilemmas are deﬁned as interactions in groups of individuals where groups
of cooperators are better off than groups of defectors, but in any mixed group de-
fectors outperform cooperators (Dawes, 1980). The fact that defectors exploit coop-
erators requires that defectors are better off in any mixed group than in the absence
of cooperators, and conversely that cooperators are worse off in any mixed group
than in the absence of defectors. In the context of pairwise interactions this requires
R>P ,T>S ,T>PandR>S . TheserequirementsaresatisﬁedbythePrisoner’s
Dilemma but there are three additional rankings possible.
The Snowdrift game (Sugden, 1986) (also known as the Chicken or Hawk-Dove
game (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973)) is deﬁned by T>R>S>P . To illustrate
this game, consider two drivers on their way home that are caught in a blizzard and
trapped on either side of a snowdrift. Each driver has the option to remove the snow-
drift and start shoveling or to remain in the car. In contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
the best choice now clearly depends on the other driver: if the other cooperates and
starts shoveling, it pays to defect and remain in the car but if the other defects, it is
better to shovel and get home than to wait for spring. Similar situations may occur
whenever the act of cooperation creates a common good that can be exploited by
others, i.e. whenever the beneﬁts of cooperation accrue not only to the partner but
also to the cooperator itself. For example, foraging yeast cells produce and secrete
an enzyme in order to lyse their environment (Greig & Travisano, 2004). The result-
ing food resource represents a valuable common good prone to exploitation by other
cells. However, despite the prospects of being exploited, a single cell may be better
off (prevent starvation) by producing the enzyme if no one else does. This last twist
relaxes the social dilemma to some extent.
The dilemma is completely relaxed if R>T>S>Pholds. This refers
to by-product mutualism where it is better to cooperate irrespective of the partner’s
4decision, i.e. cooperation dominates defection. However, note that in any mixed
group, defectors are still better off than cooperators but at the same time the payoff
of defecting individuals would increase upon switching to cooperation (because the
individualdrawsanetbeneﬁtfromitsowncooperativeact). Theremainingrankingis
R>T>P>S , for which the best choice again depends on the partner’s decision,
butnowitisbesttoaimformutualdecisions: defectiftheotherdefectsandcooperate
if the other cooperates. The social dilemma presents itself as a coordination problem
with mutual cooperation as the preferred outcome.
Cooperative interactions in groups of N individuals have received much atten-
tion in the context of Public Goods games (Fehr & G¨ achter, 2002, Kagel & Roth,
1995). In typical Public Goods experiments, individuals can make an investment
into a common pool knowing that the experimenter will multiply the total invest-
ments and distribute it equally among all participants irrespective of their contribu-
tions. In essence, Public Goods games represent N-persons Prisoner’s Dilemmas
(Dugatkin, 1997, Hauert & Szab´ o, 2003), and defection invariably dominates coop-
eration. As in pairwise interactions, maintenance of cooperation requires additional
mechanisms such as iterated interactions (Boyd & Richerson, 1988, Hauert & Schus-
ter, 1997) or local interactions in spatially structured populations (Hauert & Doebeli,
2004, Pollock, 1989). Group interactions under less stringent conditions have hardly
been studied.
1.2 Evolutionary Dynamics in Groups of N Individuals
In evolutionary dynamics we consider inﬁnitely large populations consisting of a
fraction of cooperators x and 1 − x defectors. According to replicator dynamics
(Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998), changes in x are determined by the relative perfor-
mance of cooperators as compared to defectors:
˙ x = x(1 − x)(fC − fD) (1)
5where fC,f D denote the average ﬁtness, i.e. the average payoff, of cooperators and
defectors, respectively. Here we present a general framework to study interactions of
cooperators and defectors in groups of N players. Cooperators are deﬁned as indi-
viduals that provide a beneﬁt to all members of the group at some cost to themselves.
In contrast, defectors attempt to exploit the common enterprise, avoid the costs and
provide no beneﬁt. We denote by PC(k) and PD(k), respectively, the payoff for a
single cooperator and a single defector in a group that contains k cooperators. Note
that for the payoff of a cooperator, PC(k), the cooperator is one of the k cooperators
in the group. Thus, PC(k) is deﬁned for k =1 ,...,N, while PD(k) is meaning-
ful for k =0 ,...,N − 1. Also note that, in accordance with social dilemmas,
PC(k) <P D(k) must hold for all k =1 ,...,N− 1, so that in any given group each
defector has a higher payoff than each cooperator.
In groups that are formed at random according to binomial sampling, the average

























xj(1 − x)N−1−j is the probability that there are j cooperators among
the N − 1 other individuals in a group of size N in which the focal cooperator or
defector ﬁnds itself. Consequently, the formulas above represent weighted averages
of the payoffs of a focal cooperator (focal defector) facing j cooperators among the
N − 1 co-players.
2 A Framework of Cooperation
In natural systems, the actual value of the beneﬁts provided by cooperators may
depend on the number of cooperators in the group. For example, in the case of
6foraging yeast cells, the beneﬁt provided by the ﬁrst cooperator may be critical for
survival, whereas the value of additional food decreases until, eventually, more food
becomes useless because the cells are saturated. Similarly, cooperators may produce
enzymes for enzyme-mediated reactions. The efﬁciency of the reaction may exhibit a
faster than linear increase with concentration such that additional enzyme production
has an enhanced value (Fersht, 1977, Hammes, 1982). This leads to discounted or
synergistically enhanced beneﬁts based on the number of cooperators in groups of
interacting individuals.
2.1 Synergy and Discounting
In order to model the synergistically enhanced as well as the discounted net value of
accumulated cooperative beneﬁts, we assume that defectors and cooperators, respec-
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PC(k)=PD(k) − c. (3b)
Hence, the ﬁrst cooperator provides a beneﬁt b which is shared by all N members of
the group (including itself), the second one increases everyone’s beneﬁt by b/N · w,
and so on, to the last of the k cooperators in the group providing an additional beneﬁt
of b/N · wk−1. The costs of cooperation c, however, incur only to cooperators. If
w =1 , then all cooperators provide the same incremental beneﬁt b/N. This corre-
sponds to the traditional formulation of Public Goods games with PD(k)=rkc/N
(or b = rc) where r denotes the multiplication factor of the common pool. If w<1,
then the beneﬁts are discounted and the value of the beneﬁts provided by each ad-
ditional cooperator is lower than the previous one. If w>1, then the beneﬁts are
synergistically enhanced, and each additional cooperator provides incremental bene-
ﬁts of increasing value. At this point it is important to note that neither discounting
7nor synergy involve temporal components, i.e. this does not refer to potential future
beneﬁts in iterated interactions, which is an entirely different line of research with
strong roots in economics (Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986).
Substituting the payoff functions Eq. (3) into Eq. (2) determines the average per-













1 − (1 − x + wx)
N−1￿
. (4b)
It is easy to see from these expression that the equation fC(x∗)=fD(x∗) has at
most one solution x∗ in the open interval (0,1), which, if it exists, is given by x∗ =
[1 − (cN/b)1/(N−1)]/[1 − w] (see Fig. 1). Therefore, the replicator dynamics (see
Eq. (1)) has at most one interior equilibrium. It follows that the dynamics can be
determined by considering the invasion capabilities of cooperators and defectors, i.e.
the stability of the two trivial equilibria x =0and x =1 .
2.2 Classiﬁcation of Social Dilemmas
Based on these calculations, we obtain a natural classiﬁcation of the dynamics in N-
player group interactions, which generates the four basic scenarios of evolutionary
dynamics (Nowak & Sigmund, 2004):
(i) Defectors dominate cooperators if cN/b > 1 and cN/b > wN−1 because
fD >f C holds (Fig. 1a). The only stable equilibrium is x =0 . Note that
for cN/b > 1 the minimal beneﬁt secured by a cooperator (arising from its
own act of cooperation) does not exceed the incurring costs. This parameter
region corresponds to the Prisoner’s Dilemma or Public Goods games.
(ii) If 1 >c N / b>w N−1 the two equilibria x =0and x =1are both unstable.
Cooperators and defectors can invade each other and coexist at a stable equi-
8librium x∗. This is reﬂected by fC >f D for x<x ∗ but fC <f D for x>x ∗
(Fig. 1b). This parameter region represents a generalization of the Snowdrift
game to groups of N players.
(iii) Cooperators dominate defectors if cN/b < 1 and cN/b < wN−1 because
fC >f D holds (Fig. 1c). Note, however, that defectors are still better off
in every (mixed) group (PD(k) >P C(k)), but each defector could further in-
crease its payoff by switching to cooperation (PC(k+1) >P D(k)). No interior
equilibrium exists and the only stable equilibrium is x =1 . In this parame-
ter region the social dilemma is completely relaxed and cooperation evolves
through by-product mutualism.
(iv) If wN−1 > cN/b > 1 the two equilibria x =0and x =1are both stable, i.e.
cooperators and defectors cannot invade each other. The basins of attraction
of the two equilibria are separated by the unstable equilibrium x∗. In this
bistable situation the evolutionary outcome depends on the initial fraction of
cooperators x0: if x0 >x ∗ cooperation evolves (fC >f D) but if x0 <x ∗
cooperation vanishes (fD >f C) (Fig. 1d).
Note that the conditions for successful invasions can be directly obtained from PC(k)
and PD(k), independent of binomial (or any other) sampling. The reason for this is
that if cooperators are rare, then they can only increase in abundance if a single
cooperator in a group of N − 1 defectors has a higher payoff than a group of N
defectors. Thus, cooperators can invade if PC(1) >P D(0). Likewise, if defectors
are rare, they invade only if PD(N −1) >P C(N), i.e. if a single defector in a group
with N − 1 cooperators receives a higher payoff than a cooperator in a group of
N cooperators. These conditions are sufﬁcient to generate the above classiﬁcation.
Scenarios (i) and (ii), i.e. dominant defection and co-existence, are reminiscent of the
distinction between ’strong’ and ’weak’ altruism (Charlesworth, 1979, Wilson, 1979)
9where the act of cooperation incurs either absolute costs to the cooperator (b/N < c)
or only relative costs as compared to the performance of defectors (b/N > c).
The different dynamical regimes are summarized in Fig. 2 using phase diagrams.
The ﬁgure highlights the fact that transitions between the qualitatively different types
of evolutionary games can be generated by varying the parameters w, c/b, and N.
Not surprisingly, synergy (w>1) generally favours cooperation as compared to
discounting (w<1), whereas increasing the cost-to-beneﬁt ratio c/b or the group
sizeN generallyfavoursdefection(Fig.2). Fordiscountedbeneﬁts, w<1, defection
reigns for b/N < c whereas for b/N > c cooperators persist. In the latter case,
the critical group size given by nc = 1 + log(cN/b)/log(w) separates by-product
mutualism and the (generalized) Snowdrift game: for N<n c cooperators dominate
defectors, whereas for N>n c cooperators and defectors coexist (Fig. 2b). For
synergistic interactions, w>1, cooperation dominates for b/N > c whereas for
b/N < c defectors dominate if N>n c but if N<n c the dynamics becomes
bistable (Fig. 2b).
The suggested discount/synergy framework can be fully analyzed regardless of
the group size N because there exists at most a single interior equilibrium x∗. Since
this already holds for N =2no qualitatively different scenarios are found for larger
groups of interacting individuals (even though group size does have an effect on the
dynamics, see Fig. 2). The analysis hinges on the fact that the value of the beneﬁts
provided by k cooperators in a group of N interacting players are captured in the
single parameter w.
2.3 Extending the Framework
More generally, one could, for example, introduce N different parameters αj, j =
1,...,N describing these effects, so that PD(k)=α1 + ...+ αk−1 (and e.g. again
PC(k)=PD(k) − c). It is easy to see that, in principle, such systems can have
10anywhere between zero and N −1 interior equilibria because fC,f D are polynomials
in x of degree N −1. Moreover, there are up to 2N different dynamical scenarios: N
different arrangements of interior equilibria with two alternative conﬁgurations each
because the stability of adjacent equilibria must alternate.
Competition among Defectors
To illustrate the possibility of multiple interior equilibria in a biologically motivated
setting, we ﬁrst consider a situation that includes interactions among defectors. Let
us assume a vicious type of defector that not only avoids the costs of cooperation but
additionally competes with other defectors for their share of the beneﬁt. The strength
of competition increases with the number of defectors in a group. For simplicity
we neglect competition among cooperators because if all individuals compete, the
overall beneﬁt of cooperation would essentially decrease. Defector competition can













(u − ux + x)
N−1 − (u − ux + wx)
N−1￿
where 0 <u<1 measures how the strength of competition increases with the num-
ber of defectors: the defector payoff decreases due to the presence of N −1−k other
defectors in the group, and this decrease is more pronounced for smaller u. The
cooperator payoff is assumed to be unchanged (see Eq. (3)). With this payoff struc-
ture, analytical solutions are no longer attainable in general, but Fig. 3 demonstrates
that the existence of a second interior equilibrium point can lead to dynamic regimes
not seen in the case without defector interaction. This is illustrated in Fig. 3a,b for
N =3and b/N < c. Competition among defectors supports cooperators such that
11they survive over a broader range of parameters. Moreover, this allows for stable co-
existence of cooperators and defectors for w<1 and b/N < c, which is otherwise
impossible (c.f. Fig. 2). Note that for b/N > c the qualitative dynamics with u<1
is the same as with u =1 , i.e., as in absence of defector interactions.
Variations in Effects of Discounting and Synergy
Multiple interior equilibria also occur if cooperators and defectors use different dis-
counting/synergy factors w and v, i.e. the value of the common good provided by the
cooperators is different for the two types. This could occur for example if the two
strategy types correspond to different physiological states such that cooperators and
defectors differ in their efﬁciency in taking advantage of the common resource. We
assume that the cooperator payoff remains the same as before (see Eqs. (3) and (4)),












1 − (1 − x + vx)
N−1￿
.
Only v = w allows for an analytical solution of fC = fD but in general there are
again up to N − 1 equilibria in (0,1). This case is illustrated in Fig. 3c,d for N =3 .
For example, for b/N > c large v increase the domain of co-existence, whereas
small v promote dominance of cooperation. More complicated scenarios, including
coexistence of multiple stable interior equilibria, can be observed for larger N.
3 Conclusions
In this paper, we present a general framework for cooperation in evolutionary N-
player games that encompasses and recovers traditional games such as the Prisoner’s
12Dilemma or Public Goods games as special cases. The basis of our framework is
formed by the concept of discounting and synergy, which simply takes into account
that the actual value of the beneﬁts provided by cooperators may depend on the total
number of cooperators in the group. Thus, with discounting the value of the beneﬁt
provided by the ﬁrst cooperator in a group is b, but the value of the beneﬁts provided
by each additional cooperator is discounted by a factor w<1 as compared to the
previous cooperator. All cooperators pay a cost c. For example, this leads to the deﬁ-
nition of an N-player Snowdrift game if the discounting factor w and the cost-beneﬁt
ratio cN/b are sufﬁciently small (Fig. 2). It is important to recall that discounting
does not refer to potential future beneﬁts but rather to the process of accumulating
beneﬁts provided by multiple cooperators. In the case of synergy, the value of the
beneﬁt provided by each additional cooperator is synergistically enhanced by a factor
w>1.
Viewing the traditional games from the perspective of this general framework
emphasizes that the various scenarios - Prisoner’s Dilemma or Public Goods games,
Snowdrift games, by-product mutualism, and bistability - are interconnected through
variations of the continuous parameters w, c/b and the group size N, which seam-
lessly relates seemingly disparate biological situations. For example, the discomfort
with the Prisoner’s Dilemma as the sole model for cooperation is increasing (Clutton-
Brock, 2002, Heinsohn & Parker, 1995, West et al., 2002), but viewing cooperation
in the framework of discounting opens up natural connections to related scenarios,
such as the Snowdrift game. In this way, our framework could prove to be helpful in
bridging the gap between theoretical advances and experimental evidence.
In experimental settings it is notoriously difﬁcult to quantitatively assess the ﬁt-
ness of strategic/behavioral patterns. For example, sticklebacks inspect their preda-
torspreferablyinpairsandarebelievedtobetrappedinaPrisoner’sDilemma(Milin-
ski, 1987). However, despite tremendous efforts, only the payoff ranking T>R>S
13has been experimentally conﬁrmed (Milinski et al., 1997). Consequently, it re-
mains unresolved whether the ﬁsh indeed engage in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (requiring
R>P>S ) or rather in a Snowdrift game (R>S>P ). In another exam-
ple, a Prisoner’s Dilemma interaction has been shown to occur between RNA phages
within host cells (Turner & Chao, 1999), but selection alters the payoff structure such
that cooperative and defective phage strains coexist in a Snowdrift game (Turner &
Chao, 2003).
Similarly, it has been argued that Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions occur in the
aforementioned case of enzyme production in foraging yeast cells (Greig & Trav-
isano, 2004). Despite the apparent connection to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game given
by the possibility of cheating, such frequency dependent beneﬁts may be better cap-
tured by the Snowdrift game: if cooperators abound, defection is dominant and self-
ish individuals exploit the accrued beneﬁts but as cooperators become rare, the costly
enzyme production, may provide sufﬁcient advantage to the producing individual de-
spite by-product beneﬁts to others, such that cooperation becomes dominant. Indeed,
Greig & Travisano (2004) report that cheating was beneﬁcial only if a substantial
fraction of the yeast population was cooperating, i.e., producing the enzyme.
Outside of biology, the study of social dilemmas has received particular attention
by experimental economists and anthropologists (Fehr & G¨ achter, 2002, Henrich
et al., 2001, Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). Humans display an apparently irrational,
high readiness to cooperate in Public Goods and Ultimatum games (G¨ uth et al., 1982,
Nowak et al., 2000), which confounds the basic rationality assumptions of homo oe-
conomicus. In both games, defection is dominant but the Ultimatum game adds
aspects of punishment because it can be interpreted as a Prisoner’s Dilemma interac-
tion followed by a round of (costly) punishment (Sigmund et al., 2001). Punishment
and reputation have been identiﬁed as very potent promoters of human cooperation in
social dilemmas (Fehr & G¨ achter, 2002, Milinski et al., 2002, Wedekind & Milinski,
142000). Such additional mechanisms can be easily incorporated into our framework.
However, already in Public Goods interactions, where only the multiplication factor
of the common good depends on the total amount invested, qualitatively different
outcomes can be generated, which allow e.g. for co-existence of cooperators and de-
fectors in a generalized Snowdrift game. In experimental settings, variations of the
multiplication factor could test the sensitivity of human behavior to quantitative and
qualitative changes of the interaction characteristics.
In summary, Snowdrift games can be considered as social dilemmas that are in-
termediate between Prisoner’s Dilemma games (or Public Goods games in larger
groups) and by-product mutualism, which occur whenever ordinary selﬁsh behavior
beneﬁts others (Brown, 1983, West-Eberhard, 1975). By-product mutualism has also
been put forth to challenge the Prisoner’s Dilemma for explaining patterns of coop-
eration in natural populations (Connor, 1995, 1996, Dugatkin, 1996, Milinski, 1996).
Our general theoretical framework for cooperation in social dilemmas seems capable
of reconciling the different viewpoints and emphasizes that the different dynamical
domains of social dilemmas are related by continuous changes in biologically mean-
ingful parameters.
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Figure 1: Full classiﬁcation of the evolutionary dynamics for discounted and syner-
gistically enhanced beneﬁts of cooperation in social dilemma interactions in groups
of arbitrary size. The average payoff of cooperators, fC (solid line), and defec-
tors, fD (dashed line) is shown as a function of the frequency of cooperators x
for different discount/synergy factors w. a Defection dominates for b/N < c and
w<w c =( c/b)1/(N−1) (fD >f C for all x). This corresponds to Public Goods (Pris-
oner’s Dilemma) interactions. b For larger beneﬁts (b/N > c,w < wc) the game
dynamics has a stable equilibrium x∗ (fC >f D for x<x ∗ but fC <f D for x>x ∗).
This generalizes the Snowdrift game to interactions in groups of arbitrary size. c For
larger w>w c (b/N > c) cooperation becomes dominant (fC >f D for all x). This
scenario describes by-product mutualism. d For b/N < c and w>w c the dynamics
is bi-stable: for x<x ∗ cooperators vanish (fD >f C) but for x>x ∗ cooperators dom-
inate (fC >f D). Parameters: N =5 ,b= 10 and a c =3 ,w=3 /4; b c =1 ,w=3 /4;
c c =1 ,w=4 /3; d c =3 ,w=4 /3.
































































Figure 2: Phase diagrams illustrating the different dynamical regimes. The dash-
dotted line separates discounted and synergistically enhanced beneﬁts (w =1 ). a
For any ﬁxed group size (here N =5 ) the dynamics is determined by the cost-to-
beneﬁt ratio c/b and the discount/synergy factor w. In the case of discounting (w<1)
decreasing c/b facilitates cooperation and may lead to transitions from dominant de-
fection (Prisoner’s Dilemma) to co-existence of cooperators and defectors (Snow-
drift games) and ﬁnally to dominant cooperation (by-product mutualism). Along the
dashed line the interior ﬁxed point is x∗ =0 .5. Similarly, in the case of synergy
(w>1), increasing the beneﬁts turns dominant defection into bi-stability and ends
with dominant cooperation. Note that for w<1 cooperators can only survive if
cN/b < 1. This condition is not necessary for w>1. Also note that coexistence re-
quires w<1 and bi-stability w>1, whereas dominant cooperation or defection can
occur for w greater, less or equal to one. Increasing N leaves the qualitative results
unchanged and merely increases the slope of the boundary between co-existence
and cooperation (defection and bi-stability) but it always runs through cN/b = w =1 .
b Dynamics as determined by group size N and discount/synergy w for c/b =2 /10.
Decreasing N favors cooperation by increasing the domain of cooperation, decreas-
ing the domain of defection and, additionally, by shifting the co-existence equilibrium
towards cooperation as well as by increasing the basin of attraction of the coopera-





































































































Figure 3: Multiple interior equilibria can occur in groups of N ≥ 3 interacting individ-
uals. Positions of stable (solid line) and unstable (dashed line) equilibria are shown
as a function of the discount/synergy factor w, which acts as a bifurcation parame-
ter. a An unstable interior ﬁxed point appears upon increasing w and the dynamics
changes from dominating defection to bi-stability (b/N < c). b Same as a but includ-
ing competition among defectors within each group (see Eq. (5)). This introduces a
saddle-node bifurcation as w is increased, such that cooperators either go extinct or
co-exist with a small fraction of defectors. For further increases in w the stable inte-
rior equilibrium leaves the interval (0,1) resulting in a transcritical bifurcation which
leads to bi-stability. c Cooperators and defectors have different discount/synergy
factors w and v, respectively (see Eq. (6)). For b/N > c and larger v the region
of co-existence extends into the realm of synergy (w>1). This never happens in
the case v = w (c.f. Fig. 2). d Same as c but for smaller v: another saddle-node
bifurcation occurs as w is decreased, which changes the regime of dominant coop-
eration into a regime of bi-stability, where pure cooperation as well as co-existence
with a minority of cooperators are stable. Decreasing w further leads to another
transcritical bifurcation as the unstable equilibrium leaves (0,1) and results in glob-
ally stable coexistence. Parameters: N =3 ,b=3and a c =1 .1; b c =1 .1,u=0 .5;
c c =0 .9,v=1 .8; d c =0 .9,v=0 .2.
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